

Platformized Precarity, Religious Giving, and Welfare Authority in Indonesian Gig Work

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ABSTRACT

Digital labor platforms have become influential sites of public power in Indonesia by governing access to livelihood, disciplining workers through algorithmic systems, and structuring the conditions under which economic survival remains possible. In urban gig work, this emerging platform authority operates alongside fragmented state welfare and non-state religious support, creating a layered regime in which legitimacy, obligation, and protection are distributed across unequal institutional actors. This article examines how platformized precarity in Indonesian gig work is governed through the interaction of algorithmic control, incomplete public welfare, and religiously mediated forms of support and legitimacy. It adopts a qualitative, theory-driven approach that integrates scholarship on platform labor, welfare governance, political authority, and moral economy. The discussion draws on academic literature, policy documents, platform-related public materials, and documented accounts concerning ride-hailing, delivery work, social protection gaps, and religious giving in Indonesia. Analytical attention is directed to four interconnected dimensions: platform authority, welfare fragmentation, religious support, and the displacement of responsibility across firms, state institutions, households, and moral communities. A mechanism-based synthesis is used to clarify how digital firms exercise practical governing power while non-state religious actors and obligations help absorb the social consequences of weak formal protection. Platformized precarity emerges as a condition in which platforms govern livelihood without assuming full welfare responsibility, while religious charity and moral obligation function as supplementary infrastructures of legitimacy and survival. Indonesian gig work therefore reveals a hybrid field of governance in which state authority remains partial, platform power expands, and religiously grounded support becomes central to the everyday management of insecurity. The article contributes to the field by offering a POLAR-relevant framework for understanding how religion shapes welfare legitimacy and public power under digital capitalism, and how weak political institutions redirect social protection into morally authorized non-state channels.

Keywords: Political Authority, Religion, Welfare Governance, Gig Work

INTRODUCTION

Digital labor platforms have become influential institutions of everyday governance in Indonesian cities, not only because they organize work, but because they shape authority, discipline, and access to livelihood through opaque digital systems (Aminuddin & Kusumawati, 2023). Ride-hailing, delivery, and other app-mediated services now regulate the rhythms of urban mobility and income generation for large numbers of young workers. These systems do more than match labor with demand, because they rank workers, assign incentives, impose sanctions, and define acceptable conduct through proprietary rules. In this sense, platform capitalism has created a new arena of practical authority in which code, metrics, and contractual asymmetry structure ordinary survival (Supriadi et al., 2025). Yet this authority does not operate in a social vacuum. It is embedded in a society where religious institutions, moral obligation, and public expectations about justice continue to matter for how power is interpreted and contested. Indonesia is especially important in this regard because platform labor is expanding within a democratic

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setting marked by widespread religiosity, strong associational life, and uneven welfare capacity. The rise of gig work therefore presents not only a labor-market transformation, but a question about how political authority and religiously informed legitimacy interact under contemporary digital capitalism.

The central problem lies in the fact that platform workers are governed by systems that exercise practical power over earnings and survival while remaining only weakly accountable as employers, public institutions, or welfare providers (Wood et al., 2018). Platform firms structure labor through algorithmic management, ratings, performance indicators, and incentives, yet they often disclaim responsibility for long-term worker protection by treating workers as independent partners. This creates a legitimacy problem because digital authority is highly consequential in practice but institutionally thin in its obligations. For workers, the issue is not merely unstable income, but the experience of being ruled by a system that can punish, deprioritize, or exclude them without meaningful bargaining power (Sitorus & Kornitasari, 2024).

The real-world relevance of this problem becomes sharper where social protection is fragmented and formal employment guarantees remain inaccessible for many young urban workers. Under those conditions, platform authority extends beyond labor coordination and enters the terrain of everyday governance (Putri et al., 2023). Religious giving, charitable obligation, and moral narratives of fairness then become important because they help interpret who should bear responsibility for precarity. The article therefore addresses a problem located at the intersection of platform power, welfare gaps, and the moral-political distribution of obligation in Indonesian public life.

A substantial body of scholarship already clarifies several dimensions of this field. Research on platform labor has shown that algorithmic management governs workers through opaque systems of ranking, surveillance, and dynamic incentives that intensify insecurity while preserving managerial flexibility (Novianto et al., 2023). Studies of precarity have also established that unstable work is not simply an economic condition, but a wider structure affecting time, planning, dignity, and exposure to risk. Work on Indonesian gig labor has further demonstrated that app-based work intersects with entrenched informality, fragmented social protection, and periodic conflict over fares, employment recognition, and working conditions. At the same time, scholarship on religion and welfare has shown that in many Muslim societies, charitable practices such as zakat, sedekah, and mosque-based redistribution operate not only as acts of piety but as practical infrastructures of support (Gray & Levitt, 2020).

Research on political authority also indicates that legitimacy is never purely institutional, because power must be justified through norms that publics can recognize as morally defensible. These insights make clear that digital labor governance, welfare insufficiency, and religiously inflected obligation are each significant in their own right. What remains less well developed is how they interact as part of one broader field of authority (Hakim, 2025).

What is still under-specified is the way platformized labor insecurity is absorbed, interpreted, and normalized through overlapping religious and political logics of responsibility. Existing discussions often treat gig work as a problem of labor classification, innovation policy, or employment flexibility, but these framings leave open the question of who is expected to govern insecurity when neither platforms nor the state provide sufficient protection. Religious charity and peer solidarity are frequently acknowledged as coping mechanisms, yet they are rarely theorized as part of the broader politics of authority (Shekhawat

& Khare, 2025). There is still limited clarity about how moral obligation can soften the effects of precarity while also displacing pressure for institutional reform.

It is also unclear how platform firms benefit indirectly when worker survival depends on households, mosque networks, and informal reciprocal support. Without a more integrated account, religion appears as background culture rather than as a force shaping legitimacy and governance under digital capitalism. The unresolved issue is therefore not only how workers survive, but how responsibility for survival becomes distributed across actors with very unequal power (Novianto, 2024). That question is central to any journal concerned with political authority and religion because it asks who governs, who justifies, and who bears obligation when formal institutions remain partial or absent.

The research gap becomes sharper when the article is reframed through the conceptual concerns of political authority and religion. Existing platform studies provide strong accounts of algorithmic control, but often stop short of asking how this control is morally stabilized in societies where legitimacy cannot rest on market efficiency alone. Studies of Islamic charity and moral economy explain how redistribution and obligation are socially organized, yet they do not always connect these practices to the governance deficits produced by platformized labor.

Scholarship on welfare fragmentation highlights institutional weakness, but often neglects the role of religious actors and norms in filling, legitimizing, or contesting those gaps. What is missing is a framework that can connect digital labor governance to state-religion relations and to the public authority exercised by religiously grounded support systems (Setiawan et al., 2025). Such a framework is necessary because platform precarity in Indonesia is not governed only by apps or contracts. It is also shaped by state incapacity, weak labor protection, mosque-based redistribution, moral narratives of fairness, and informal expectations about who should help whom. The gap, then, lies in the absence of an integrated explanation of how economic insecurity is governed through a layered field of platform authority, fragmented public power, and religiously mediated obligation.

Filling this gap is theoretically justified because authority in this setting is neither singular nor fully formalized. Platform firms govern through digital infrastructure, the state governs through incomplete labor and welfare regimes, and religious institutions govern through moral claims, redistributive practices, and reputational expectations about justice and compassion. A coherent analysis must therefore move beyond the idea that governance belongs only to the state or that religion functions only as private ethical consolation. Religious charity can operate as a form of non-state welfare governance, while platform rules can exercise quasi-public power without accepting the responsibilities normally attached to employment regulation. This makes Indonesia's gig economy an analytically productive site for examining hybrid authority (Ayu, 2024). Theoretically, the article is grounded in the insight that legitimacy is assembled across institutions, infrastructures, and moral communities rather than produced by any one actor alone. Such an approach allows the analysis to explain why platform control can persist despite weak formal protection and why religious obligation can both mitigate hardship and reduce pressure for structural accountability. The coherence of the argument lies in treating precarity as a field in which political authority and religious obligation intersect rather than as a narrowly economic problem.

From this foundation, the article is guided by a set of interrelated research questions. How does algorithmic management exercise practical authority over gig workers in ways that resemble governance rather than mere market coordination. In what ways does fragmented social protection alter the balance between platform responsibility, state obligation, and household survival. How do religious giving,

mosque-based redistribution, and moral narratives of fairness function as infrastructures of support for platform workers under unstable earning conditions. Do these religiously grounded forms of assistance primarily mitigate insecurity, or do they also contribute to the displacement of welfare responsibility away from platforms and public institutions. How do workers interpret the legitimacy of platform control when livelihood shocks are managed through peer solidarity and religious obligation rather than formal labor rights. What does this reveal about the relationship between digital capitalism, non-state welfare, and the moral economy of authority in contemporary Indonesia. These questions shift the discussion away from whether gig work is flexible or insecure and toward the wider issue of who governs precarity and under what moral justification.

The urgency of these questions is heightened by the scale and normalization of platform labor in Indonesian urban life. For many young workers, gig work is no longer a marginal or temporary arrangement, but a central route into everyday income under conditions of weak formal employment. At the same time, Indonesia remains a society in which religion carries public authority not only in symbolic terms but in the organization of charity, obligation, and moral expectation (Hukum et al., 2025). This means that the governance of platform precarity cannot be understood through labor economics alone.

The article contributes by repositioning gig work within the conceptual field of political authority and religion, showing that digital labor insecurity is sustained through a layered arrangement of platform control, fragmented state protection, and religiously mediated support (Yasih, 2022). It also contributes to debates on state-religion relations by demonstrating that religious actors and practices can function as practical welfare infrastructures in areas where market and state power leave persistent gaps. More broadly, the article offers a way to analyze how non-state moral authority can both challenge and stabilize new regimes of economic governance. This perspective makes platform labor in Indonesia relevant not only to studies of digital work, but also to broader debates on legitimacy, governance, and public power in religiously plural democracies.

RESEARCH METHOD

This article employs a qualitative, mechanism-oriented research design to examine how platform authority, fragmented public protection, and religiously mediated support interact in the governance of gig work in urban Indonesia. A qualitative approach is appropriate because the central object of analysis consists of meanings, legitimacy claims, moral obligations, institutional gaps, and everyday experiences of digitally mediated control that cannot be adequately reduced to numerical indicators alone (Dieteren et al., 2022). The analytical framework combines the concept of platformized precarity with perspectives on political authority, welfare fragmentation, and moral economy in order to explain how risk is governed across overlapping actors rather than through a single institutional center. Within this framework, platform firms are treated as exercising practical authority through algorithmic management, the state as providing incomplete and uneven protection, and religiously grounded networks as supplying morally authorized forms of support (White et al., 2025).

This design works well for the research because the article is concerned not only with labor instability, but with how authority is justified, displaced, and socially absorbed under digital capitalism. A qualitative strategy makes it possible to reconstruct how workers, institutions, and moral communities are linked through relations of dependency, obligation, and uneven responsibility. It also preserves the contextual specificity required to explain why religious giving and peer solidarity matter politically rather

than appearing as merely cultural background. Such a design is therefore especially suitable for a research problem located at the intersection of labor governance, public authority, and religion in contemporary Indonesia.

The data consist of academic literature, labor and welfare policy documents, platform-related public materials, organizational statements, media reports, and documented accounts concerning Indonesian ride-hailing and delivery work, social protection access, peer support, and religious giving. Data collection was conducted through purposive selection of materials directly relevant to algorithmic management, fragmented welfare provision, public and non-state forms of protection, and moral narratives surrounding fairness, charity, and worker survival in urban Indonesia (Chand, 2025).

The units of analysis are not abstract labor markets or anonymous statistical populations, but the discursive and institutional expressions of platformized precarity, including platform rules, welfare arrangements, public claims about responsibility, and religiously mediated support practices that shape how insecurity is governed (Padgett, 2008). A qualitative coding matrix served as the primary instrument for organizing the material according to key analytical dimensions, namely algorithmic control, livelihood instability, welfare fragmentation, peer solidarity, religious giving, legitimacy claims, and the displacement of responsibility across platforms, state institutions, households, and moral communities.

These dimensions functioned as the principal variables for tracing how platform power is normalized, how protection remains partial, and how religious obligation becomes practically relevant in everyday labor governance (Fort, 2020). Trustworthiness was strengthened through source triangulation, conceptual consistency in coding, and explicit alignment between the research questions, theoretical framework, and analytical categories, while reliability was supported by maintaining a transparent audit trail of source selection and thematic classification.

Validity was enhanced by restricting the analysis to materials directly connected to Indonesian gig work and by interpreting them through the same integrated framework across all sources. Because the study relies on publicly accessible documentary materials and does not involve direct interaction with human participants, formal informed consent was not required; nevertheless, ethical standards were maintained by avoiding selective misrepresentation, treating precarious workers as a vulnerable population in interpretive terms, and preserving confidentiality wherever non-public individual information could otherwise be inferred.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Platformized precarity in Indonesian gig work is governed through a layered field of authority rather than through labor-market exchange alone. Platform firms organize access to income, discipline, and visibility through digital infrastructures that shape who works, when work becomes available, and under what conditions participation remains viable (Permana, 2025). At the same time, formal state protection remains present but incomplete, especially where social insurance portability, contribution continuity, and labor recognition do not align with volatile app-mediated earnings. Religious giving and morally grounded support networks then enter this field not as peripheral charity, but as practical mechanisms through which insecurity is absorbed and interpreted. Gig work therefore reveals a pluralized regime of governance in which digital firms, public institutions, households, and religious communities all participate in structuring livelihood survival. This makes the article relevant to debates on political authority because it shifts attention from sovereignty in formal institutions alone to authority

as exercised through distributed, everyday control over risk and support. The core pattern is one of overlapping authority in which platform governance, weak welfare capacity, and religious obligation interact to organize precarious labor.

A central dimension of this arrangement is the practical authority exercised by platforms. Ratings, incentives, dynamic allocation, penalties, and suspension regimes function as more than technical coordination tools (Frey, 2020). They shape the everyday conditions under which workers can secure earnings and maintain economic continuity. Platform authority is practical because it regulates access to livelihood without assuming the full obligations normally associated with employment or public administration. Workers remain formally independent while being substantively governed by systems that can intensify effort, limit choice, and redefine acceptable conduct. This authority is also asymmetrical because the rules are often opaque, rapidly changeable, and difficult to contest effectively. Such characteristics place platform firms in a quasi-governing role within the urban labor economy. Their power lies not only in market intermediation, but in their capacity to structure dependence through digital rule-making.

This form of authority becomes especially consequential when work is a primary livelihood rather than a supplemental activity. Many workers remain dependent on platforms not because conditions are secure, but because app-mediated work provides one of the few accessible routes into urban income under constrained labor-market conditions. Dependence amplifies the force of algorithmic governance, since small shifts in rankings, demand allocation, or incentives can have immediate household consequences. Platform control thus extends into decisions about working time, bodily endurance, fuel costs, debt management, and family obligations. Governance in this sense is exercised through everyday compulsion rather than formal command (Alfarizi et al., 2025). Workers adapt to rules they do not design and cannot meaningfully negotiate, yet those rules remain decisive for survival. The practical authority of the platform therefore resembles public power in effect even when it lacks public accountability in form. This is one reason gig work must be read as a governance issue rather than only as a labor-market phenomenon.

The second major pattern concerns the incompleteness of state protection. Welfare programs and labor protections may exist in principle, yet their accessibility is weakened by unstable contribution capacity, administrative friction, and the mismatch between statutory designs and platform-mediated volatility. Social insurance systems typically assume regular income flows and clearer employment status than gig workers often possess. As a result, the state appears present but not sufficiently stabilizing in the everyday management of risk. Illness, account suspension, household emergencies, and work interruptions remain only partially buffered by formal mechanisms. This creates governance gaps in which vulnerability is not fully privatized, yet not effectively socialized either. State authority remains institutionally visible but practically thin where workers cannot rely on timely and sustained protection. Fragmented public protection thus shapes the conditions under which non-state forms of welfare become politically and morally important.

These governance gaps help explain why religiously mediated support becomes central in the everyday life of platform workers. Zakat, sedekah, mosque-based assistance, charitable networks, and religiously framed reciprocal obligation function as practical infrastructures of support when platform and state protection remain insufficient. Such mechanisms are not merely symbolic affirmations of piety. They may provide food, temporary cash assistance, debt relief, emergency care support, or access to

community-based help during periods of income disruption. Religious support therefore enters the labor regime as a non-state welfare function. Its authority derives not from statutory compulsion, but from moral legitimacy, social recognition, and the expectation that hardship should be met by religiously meaningful forms of redistribution. This makes religious institutions and networks relevant to POLAR's concern with how religion shapes governance and public power. In Indonesian gig work, religious obligation becomes one of the means through which survival is governed beyond the state.

Religious support also performs a legitimizing role by giving precarity a moral language that is more bearable than administrative abandonment. Charity and communal assistance can preserve dignity, reduce shame, and place hardship within an ethical framework of mutual obligation rather than pure market failure. This matters because legitimacy is not only about who rules, but about how suffering is interpreted and socially justified. Religious assistance may help workers understand insecurity as something that can still be met with moral solidarity and social recognition. At the same time, this moral buffering creates ambiguity. Support that sustains workers in periods of crisis may also reduce the immediate visibility of structural failure in labor governance. In this sense, religiously grounded redistribution is both protective and politically consequential. It can mitigate hardship while leaving intact the broader displacement of responsibility from platforms and public institutions onto moral communities.

These dynamics can be summarized through four interrelated dimensions: platform authority, welfare fragmentation, religious support, and responsibility displacement.

Table 1. Comparative Dimensions of Platform Authority, Welfare Fragmentation, and Religious Support in Indonesian Gig Work

Analytical Dimension	Main Pattern	Political Implication
Platform authority	Algorithms, ratings, and incentives govern access to earnings	Digital firms exercise practical public-like power
Welfare fragmentation	Formal protection exists but remains uneven and unstable	State authority is present but incomplete
Religious support	Charity and moral obligation buffer livelihood shocks	Non-state religious actors fill governance gaps
Responsibility displacement	Risks are absorbed by workers, households, and moral communities	Accountability shifts away from platforms and the state

Table 1 clarifies that gig work is governed through overlapping regimes of authority rather than through labor exchange alone. Platform authority structures daily dependence, yet it does so without the protective obligations usually associated with employment. Welfare fragmentation means that state power remains visible in institutional terms but limited in its practical capacity to stabilize volatile work. Religious support then enters as a non-state form of welfare governance, making moral communities part of the broader architecture through which labor insecurity is managed. Responsibility displacement ties these dimensions together by showing that the costs of volatility are redistributed downward and outward, onto workers, families, and charitable networks. The table therefore supports the article's main argument that Indonesian gig work is shaped by a pluralized governance field in which political authority is dispersed across digital firms, incomplete public institutions, and religiously mediated support systems. This perspective expands the analysis of gig work from employment insecurity to the politics of legitimacy,

obligation, and public power. Authority is exercised, supplemented, and normalized across institutional boundaries.

This interpretation builds on prior scholarship while extending it in a more explicitly political direction. Research on platform labor has already established that algorithmic management intensifies insecurity through metrics, incentives, and opaque disciplinary systems. Studies of welfare fragmentation likewise show that workers in informal and semi-formal sectors often fall between categories of formal protection. Moral economy scholarship has long emphasized that reciprocity, obligation, and shared ethical norms shape how communities respond to subsistence pressure. The present analysis brings these strands together with debates on political authority and religion by treating religious support not as background culture, but as a governance mechanism within a field of institutional insufficiency. This move is significant because it shows that public power in contemporary capitalism is not monopolized by the state. It is distributed across actors with different capacities, obligations, and sources of legitimacy. Indonesian gig work therefore reveals how authority is assembled through digital rule, weak public provision, and moral-community mediation.

The implications for state–religion relations are substantial. Religious institutions do not appear here simply as independent spiritual bodies commenting on labor injustice from the outside. They also operate as practical welfare actors that partly stabilize the consequences of weak labor governance. This places religion within the field of public authority, even where intervention occurs through charity rather than through formal policymaking. Such a configuration complicates sharp distinctions between state welfare, market provision, and religious action. It shows that religious obligation can supplement public power while also obscuring the extent to which public and corporate actors have shifted responsibility downward. The interaction is therefore ambivalent. Religious support may sustain social solidarity and reduce acute suffering, but it may also normalize a governance structure in which digital firms benefit from labor they do not fully protect and states tolerate welfare gaps that moral communities are expected to soften. This is precisely the kind of mutual transformation between political systems and religious actors that POLAR is designed to examine.

These patterns also matter for labor governance and social policy. If platform labor is sustained partly through religiously mediated support, then the apparent viability of gig work depends on protections external to the platform itself. This has direct implications for labor law, welfare portability, and the recognition of workers as subjects of public responsibility rather than merely entrepreneurial actors. Policy design cannot stop at the formal availability of insurance or digital inclusion mechanisms. It must ask whether workers with volatile income and unstable status can actually sustain access to protection over time. It must also account for the hidden subsidies provided by families, neighborhoods, and religious communities. More adequate governance would require reducing dependence on emergency solidarity without undermining the social networks through which many workers currently survive. This means that social protection reform is not only a matter of efficiency, but of restoring alignment between authority and obligation.

The discussion also reveals important strengths and limitations. One strength lies in the integrated framework, which makes visible how digital firms, welfare institutions, and religious support systems jointly govern precarious work. Another lies in the repositioning of gig labor as a field of political authority rather than solely of labor-market flexibility or technological change. At the same time, sectors and cities vary, and the relative force of religious support, state provision, and platform control may differ across

local contexts and occupational segments. Publicly available materials also cannot capture every backstage negotiation through which workers interpret obligation or manage hidden debt and family pressures. One especially important complexity is that religious charity can both mitigate hardship and normalize institutional withdrawal. This is not a contradiction to be resolved, but a central feature of how pluralized governance operates under platform capitalism. The same support system that preserves dignity may also stabilize an unequal distribution of responsibility.

Future research would benefit from closer comparison across platform sectors, localities, and religious institutional settings in order to clarify how different authority configurations shape worker survival. More attention is also needed to mosque networks, Islamic philanthropy organizations, and local state actors who may mediate between precarious labor and public support. Research on worker trajectories over time could illuminate whether religiously grounded support enables mobility, merely reproduces endurance, or reshapes expectations about state and platform accountability. Comparative study of non-Muslim settings or mixed urban contexts would also help specify which dimensions of this governance field are broadly portable and which are religiously specific. Practical relevance lies in developing labor and welfare reforms that recognize the actual social infrastructure supporting gig workers rather than assuming that market flexibility is self-sustaining. Democratic accountability would be strengthened if platforms, public institutions, and religious actors were analyzed not as isolated domains, but as interconnected participants in the governance of precarity. Indonesian gig work thus offers a significant case for understanding how political authority and religious obligation are being recomposed under digital capitalism.

CONCLUSION

Platformized precarity in Indonesian gig work is governed through an overlapping field of authority in which platform firms, incomplete state protection, and religiously mediated support each play distinct but interconnected roles. The discussion has emphasized that digital platforms exercise practical public-like power by structuring access to earnings, discipline, and continued participation through ratings, incentives, and sanctions, while remaining weakly accountable as employers or welfare providers. Formal state protection remains present but insufficiently stabilizing, especially where social insurance and labor safeguards do not fit volatile app-based work. In this governance gap, zakat, sedekah, mosque-based assistance, and morally grounded reciprocal support function as non-state welfare mechanisms that help workers endure income shocks and preserve dignity.

These practices are not merely residual cultural responses, but part of the practical organization of survival under platform capitalism. At the same time, the reliance on religious and household support also displaces responsibility away from firms and public institutions, making precarity more socially manageable without fully resolving its structural causes. Indonesian gig work therefore reveals how labor insecurity is governed through a plural regime of digital authority, fragmented public protection, and religiously legitimized support.

The article contributes to the field by repositioning gig work from a narrow question of labor-market flexibility into a broader problem of political authority, welfare governance, and religion. Its central conceptual contribution lies in showing that platformized precarity is not sustained by algorithmic management alone, but by the interaction between digital rule, state incompleteness, and non-state moral infrastructures of support. This perspective extends existing scholarship on platform labor by

demonstrating that authority in the gig economy is distributed across institutions and communities rather than concentrated solely in firms or the state. It also contributes to debates on state–religion relations by showing that religious giving and charitable obligation can operate as practical forms of welfare governance when formal protection remains partial.

In that sense, the article speaks directly to POLAR’s concern with how religion shapes public power and how political systems reorganize religious actors and obligations within wider governance arrangements. The broader analytical value lies in clarifying that legitimacy under digital capitalism is produced not only through law and contract, but through moral narratives of fairness, duty, and communal support. Gig work in Indonesia thus provides an important case for understanding how political authority and religious obligation are recomposed in contemporary democratic societies.

Future research should extend this framework through comparative work across platform sectors, cities, and religious institutional settings in order to identify how different configurations of authority shape worker survival and vulnerability. Greater attention is also needed to mosque networks, Islamic philanthropy organizations, local welfare intermediaries, and the role of public agencies in mediating the boundary between charity and formal entitlement. Longitudinal research would be especially useful for examining whether religiously grounded support merely cushions recurring shocks or also shapes workers’ expectations about citizenship, rights, and institutional accountability over time.

Comparative analysis with other religious traditions and non-Muslim urban settings would further clarify which dimensions of this governance field are specific to Indonesian Muslim moral economies and which reflect broader transformations under digital labor regimes. Practical development should focus on labor and welfare reforms that reduce the displacement of responsibility onto households and moral communities while preserving the social solidarities that workers currently depend upon. Advancing this agenda remains important for building more accountable forms of platform governance and more equitable alignments between market power, public protection, and religiously informed social support.

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